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INTRODUCTION

This Article is intended to provide guidelines to the practicing
attorney or litigator in resolving allegations of fraud in disputes involving computers or other high technology products or processes.
Although such products or systems are complex and often involve
unique factual circumstances, general principles of law are still applicable. While the illustrative context of this Article is that of computer sales, the analysis and legal principles discussed would apply
to any circumstance in which a fraud claim is advanced.1
Computer manufacturers and purchasers are generally knowledgeable about the legal consequences of their commercial transactions, and the terms and conditions of such transactions usually are
embodied in a written agreement. The definitive nature of written
contracts has increased the use of alternative legal theories such as
fraud in an attempt by the purchaser to circumvent those contracts
that contain obstacles to recovery. One important such obstacle is a
contract provision limiting the liability of the manufacturer or seller.
Often these limitations on the manufacturer's liability have been reluctantly agreed to by the buyer in order to conclude the transaction
or in order to obtain certain guarantees regarding performance of
specific features or applications. Fraud in the inducement of the
contract is a prominent legal theory used in an attempt to avoid
2
these contract provisions in subsequent legal action.
In addition to agreeing to the liability limitation provisions,
often the purchasing party either has had the opportunity to conduct, or has actually conducted, an investigation of the computer
system, technology or process it is purchasing. The purchaser's investigation or failure to investigate also has legal ramifications for
its fraud claim.
This Article examines two elements of the defense against the
theory of fraud in the inducement of the contract. 3 First, in the situ1. The use of illustrations involving computer sales is timely. Citing numerous
examples, the court in Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291, 1293 (5th Cir.

1980) stated: "There have been an enormous number of suits in which disgruntled
computer users have attempted to sort out their rights where both computer vendors
and so-called lessors have been involved." Id. The claim of fraud is increasingly asserted in these cases.
2. See, e.g., APLications Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 501 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Badger Bearing Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Wis. 1977), affd

mem., 588 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1978). As stated by the APLications court, "fraud is a
magic word, and it is elementary that any contract can be put aside for fraud." 501 F.
Supp. at 134. It is a correct statement that rescission is appropriate, but as discussed
infra, there are supplementary legal principles which apply in certain factual
circumstances.
3. Other defensive measures such as attacks upon other basic elements of a

COMPUTER LITIGATION

19821

ation where the party alleging fraud wishes to retain the benefits of
a contract which includes a limitation of liability provision, this Article will discuss the defense that claimant's affirmance of the contract in suit prohibits any recovery under the fraud claims beyond
the limitations of liability provided in the contract. Second, this Article will discuss the claimant's duty to investigate the facts which
may preclude recovery on a fraud claim.
A.

TYPES OF LIMIrrATIONS OF LIABILITY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

In the computer and other high technology fields, there is a
great potential for claims for damage. While the hardware is a tangible element, the expected software and performance characteristics
are not always precisely established by the parties. The situation is
further complicated by the purchaser's desire to have specific adaptions or special features, the continuing development of software
programs and hardware updates and the purchaser's efforts to increase its demands regarding performance of the computer system
subsequent to installation.
At the outset of their relationship, the manufacturer ordinarily
seeks to satisfy and accommodate the needs of the purchaser. As a
result, most agreements contain provisions for repair or replacement. At times, however, this spirit of cooperation breaks down,
and the purchaser either refuses to pay the contract price or commences a legal action against the seller. To reduce the risk of judgments in such situations, 4limitation of liability clauses are drafted
into the sales agreements.
The following are examples of such limitation of liability provisions which might be encountered:
Seller ...

shall not be held responsible ...

in any event under this

agreement for more than a refund of the purchase price, less reasonable rental for past use, upon return of the equipment to Seller
claimant's fraud allegations (misrepresentation, materiality, or scienter) are not addressed in this Article. Additionally, because computer sales involving litigation usu-

ally are between sophisticated merchants, this Article does not deal with the
difficulties posed by problems of unconscionable contracts or gross disparity of bar-

gaining power. Where a purchaser is sophisticated at all, clauses limiting liability or
warranties are not normally unconscionable. Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625
F.2d 1291, 1299 (5th Cir. 1980).
4. In the commercial context, contract provisions either limiting damages or pro-

viding for liquidated damages are both legal and well recognized. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2719(1) (a) (1982).

The importance of limitation of liability clauses in the computer field is underlined by the fact that malfunctions may be attributed to an "elusive bug" which
neither party can identify or locate. See Convoy Co. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 7 Computer L Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1021 (D. Ore. 1977).
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with Seller's prior written consent. (Purchaser hereby expressly
5
waives all incidental and consequential damages.)
In no event shall UNIVAC be liable for any indirect, special or consequential damages such as loss of anticipated profits or other economic loss in connection with or arising out of the existence,
furnishing, functioning or the Customer's use of 6any item of equipment or services provided for in this Agreement.
Alternatively, the limitation clause might combine a number of restrictions as follows:
6. LIMITS OF LIABILITY: If Customer rightfully rejects the
Equipment or justifiably revokes acceptance of the Equipment,
Seller shall be liable only to repay any part of the purchase price
theretofore paid, upon the return of the Equipment to it. After acceptance of the Equipment, if any part thereof is found to be defective, under specified service conditions within 90 days after
installation, and while the warranty hereunder is in effect, Seller at
its option will repair or replace such part. The foregoing constitutes
Customer's sole and exclusive remedy for breach of the terms of
the sale of the Equipment. Seller shall in no event be liable for
damages whether direct or indirect, including without limitation incidental or consequential damages, to the customer, to any property
or to any person, for loss of profits, for downtime, for any other reason or cause by reason of Seller's negligence or otherwise, in connection with the sale, delivery, installation or use of the Equipment,
and Customer shall indemnify and hold harmless Seller against all
such liability.
In short, the contractual limitation should be clear and contain an
7
exclusive or limited remedy.
5. Badger Bearing Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919, 921 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
The Badger court held that a computer contract provision limiting the liability of the
supplier of hardware, software, or data processing services to the amount paid by the
customer is valid and enforceable. Id. at 921. See also Farris Eng'g Corp. v. Service
Bureau Corp., 406 F.2d 519 (3rd Cir. 1969). On judicial enforcement of clauses limiting
liability generally, and in computer sales contexts specifically, see Moorhead, Limiting Liability in Electronic Data Processing Service Contracts, 4 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 141 (1974). The limitation clause could be drafted to specify a specific
dollar amount if that figure was reasonable.
6. Convoy Co. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 7 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1017
(D. Ore. 1976).
7. U.C.C. § 2-719 also provides that the exclusive or limited remedy must not
"fail of its essential purpose." This criteria is most often applicable in situations
where the sole remedy is repair, and there are substantial deficiencies and substantial delay is encountered. In such circumstances, the contractual limitation of repair
might be inapplicable and therefore might not preclude recovery of damages for
fraud or breach of warranty. See Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp.,
635 F.2d 1081 (3rd Cir. 1980). Although there is divided authority, Chatlos held that a
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B.

ELEMENTS OF FRAUD

In order to avoid these limitation of liability provisions, purchasers often assert that they were defrauded and claim substantial
damage. Succinctly stated, the elements of a claim for fraud are
(1) a false or misleading misrepresentation or omission made by defendant which is (2) material and as to which (3) the defendant had
the requisite "scienter" (knowledge of falsity or its equivalent), and
that (4) plaintiff relied on the representation and (5) suffered

damage. 8

separate contractual clause excluding consequential damages nevertheless would
apply.
8. See W. PRoss.R, LAw OF TORTS § 105 (4th ed. 1977); Stone v. Farnell, 239 F.2d
750, 754 (9th Cir. 1956); Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 415, 159 P.2d 958,
961 (1945); Roberts v. Ball, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 108, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901, 905 (1976); CAL.
CrV. CODE § 1572 (West 1954). Using California law as an illustration, the criteria for
the common law are as follows:
(1) Materiality: statements are material under California law if "but for" the
statement the transaction would not have gone forward. Barron Estate Co. v. Woodruff Co., 163 Cal. 561, 562, 126 P. 351, 352 (1912); Stockton Combined Harvester & Agricultural Works v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 98 Cal. 557, 575, 33 P. 633, 637 (1893).
Misrepresentations need not be the sole cause of the transaction to be material. Elliott v. Federated Fruit & Vegetable Growers, Inc., 108 Cal. App. 412, 416, 291 P. 681, 683
(1930); Colton v. Stanford, 82 Cal. 351, 359, 23 P. 16, 26 (1890).
(2) Falsity: To be actionable, a fraudulent representation must either state a
false fact or be the opinion of an expert or of anyone who holds himself out as specially qualified. Teamsters Sec. Fund v. Sperry Rand Corp., 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep.
(Callaghan) 951 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 483, 275 P.2d 15, 17
(1954); Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, 31 Cal. 2d 744, 748, 192 P.2d 935, 939 (1948); Harizim v.
Lyman, 267 Cal. App. 2d 127, 130, 72 Cal. Rptr. 670, 673 (1968).
(3) Scienter: Scienter and intent to defraud are shown in two ways: (1) by proving the defendant had actual knowledge of the falsity of his representations or (2) by
establishing that the defendant "lacked an honest belief in their truth, or that the
statements were carelessly and recklessly made, in a manner not warranted by the
information available to the defendant." Wishnick v. Frye, 111 Cal. App. 2d 926, 930,
245 P.2d 532, 536 (1952). See also Dunn Appraisal Co. v. Honeywell Information Sys.,
Inc., No. 81-3110, slip op. (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 1982); Glovatorium, Inc. v. NCR Corp., No.
81-4453, slip op. (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 1982); Yellow Creek Logging Corp. v. Dare, 216 Cal.
App. 2d 50, 57, 30 Cal. Rptr. 629, 632-33 (1963). Where a false representation is knowingly made, intent to deceive may be inferred directly. Boss v. Bank of Am. Trust &
Say. Ass'n, 51 Cal. App. 2d 592, 598, 125 P.2d 620, 623-24 (1942). Boss is representative
of the general rule that intent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. See also
State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938); Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 225 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
(4) Reliance: California applies a "substantial factor" test in determining
whether the plaintiff relied on the representation. If the defendant's representation
is a "substantial factor in inducing plaintiff to act, even though he also relies in part
upon the advice of others, reliance is sufficiently shown." Wennerholm v. Stanford
Univ. School of Medicine, 20 Cal. 2d 713, 717, 128 P.2d 522, 524 (1942).
(5) Damages: In California, a defrauded purchaser is entitled to recover all
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Some jurisdictions, such as California, have another form of
fraud, deceit or negligent misrepresentation. 9 Under this formulation, unlike the usual fraud claim, with deceit/negligent misrepresentation, neither scienter nor an intent to defraud is required. The
intent requisite for negligent misrepresentation is merely an "intent
to induce action," which exists whenever defendant knows plaintiff
is likely to rely on its representations.10 Otherwise, the elements of
misrepresentation are the same as
an action for deceit/negligent
1
those for actual fraud.'
In California, the claimant's burden of proof for its common law
12
fraud claims is proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
Some states, such as New York and Wisconsin, require proof by
"clear and convincing" evidence.' 3 Because state law varies and because a request for application of another state's law must be
timely,' 4 counsel must make an early analysis and comparison of
the applicable state law.
losses attributable to and flowing from defendant's misconduct. See CAL. Crv. CODE
§§ 1709, 3333, 3343 (West 1973); Empire West v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 12 Cal. 3d 805,
811, 528 P.2d 31, 34, 117 Cal. Rptr. 423, 426 (1974); Hartman v. Shell Oil Co., 68 Cal. App.
3d 240, 244, 137 CaL Rptr. 244, 246 (1977). Compare New York law which provides for
the out-of-pocket damages rule thereby precluding any recovery for loss of profit.
Reno v. Bull, 226 N.Y. 546, 124 N.E. 144 (1919). Direct damages in computer cases ordinarily include deposits, purchase payments, rental and maintenance charges, programming costs, rental for hardware from other companies and the excessive wages
of a computer staff. Convoy v. Sperry Rand Corp., 672 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1982).
9. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1709-10(2) (West 1973); Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 48788, 275 P.2d 15, 20 (1954); Hale v. George A. Hormel & Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 73, 84, 121
Cal. Rptr. 144, 151 (1975).
10. Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 488, 275 P.2d 15 (1954); Yellow Creek Logging
Corp. v. Dare, 216 Cal. App. 2d 50, 58, 30 Cal. Rptr. 629, 633 (1963).
11. Stone v. Farnell, 239 F.2d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 1956); Hale v. George A. Hormel &
Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 73, 82, 121 Cal.Rptr. 144, 150 (1975).
12. Liodas v. Sahadi, 19 Cal. 3d 278, 562 P.2d 316, 137 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1977); Ford v.
Chambers, 19 Cal. 143, 144 (1861); CAl. EvD. CODE § 115 (West 1966).
13. McDonnell v. American Leduc Petroleums, Ltd., 456 F.2d 1170, 1176 (2d Cir.
1971); Borozwicz v. Chicago Mastic Co., 367 F.2d 751, 760 (7th Cir. 1966) (applying New
York law); Badger Bearing Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Wis. 1977);
Schmiedler v. Hall, 421 F. Supp. 1208, 1216 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Pittsburgh Coke & Chem.
Co. v. BoUo, 421 F. Supp. 908, 924 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Rudman v. Cowles Communications, 30 N.Y.2d 1, 10, 330 N.Y.S.2d 33, 39 (1972) ("Fraud must be made out by 'clear
and convincing evidence.' "); Manchel v. Kasdan, 286 A.D. 483, 484, 144 N.Y.S.2d 694,
695 (1955), aJ'dmem., 1 N.Y.2d 734, 134 N.E.2d 687, 151 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1956). ('The evidence must be clear and convincing and the inference of fraud unequivocal."); Lynch
v. Gibson, 254 A.D. 47, 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 672, 675 (1938). For an analysis of other states
using this standard of proof, see 9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2498 at 329 n.13 (3d ed.
1979).
14. Chavez v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 413 F. Supp. 1203 (E.D. Cal. 1976). See
also APLications Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 501 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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Typically, these liability elements of a fraud claim are difficult
for a computer purchaser to assert. Even in those instances where
these elements are established, however, the discussion below relative to recoverable damages is pertinent.
II. AFFIRMANCE OF CONTRACT LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY

A. CLAIMANT's

DECISION TO COMMENCE AN ACTION OR
ASSERT A COUNTERCLAIM

At the outset of the action, once a plaintiff purchaser or counterclaimant purchaser decides to claim that it has been misled or
"fraudulently induced" to enter into a contract, 15 it faces a difficult
choice. If, indeed, a fraud has been practiced, the purchaser has the
right to tender back to the seller all benefits conferred by the defrauding seller and sue the manufacturer and seller for such damages allegedly flowing from the fraud as would restore the purchase
to status quo ante.16 In the alternative, it could affirm the contract,
continue to accept the benefits (and obligations) of that contract
and, subject to those obligations,' 7 sue the manufacturer to compel
performance of that contract and/or recover damages, if any, traceable to the fraud allegedly committed.' 8 The United States Supreme
Court stated this essential principle in Shappiro v. Goldberg.19
It is well settled by repeated decisions of this court that where a
15. The use of a fraud theory is becoming increasingly popular due to the factual
and legal difficulties of a negligence action and the failure of remedies theories.
Moreover, in many instances a prima facie case of fraud may be made because there
is a narrow distinction between sales "puffing" and fraud. Allegations of fraud, however, must be pleaded with particularity. FED. R. Cry. P. 9(b). A fraud claim must be
supported by substantial evidence; it cannot be a breach of contract claim couched in
the legal theory of fraud. Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291, 1294 (5th
Cir. 1980); Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39, 45-46 (D.S.C.
1974).
16. See, e.g., N.Y. Crv. PRAC. LAw AND RuLEs §§ 3002(e), 3004 (McKinney 1974);
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 484 (1933); Brennan v. National Equitable Inv. Co., 247
N.Y. 486, 160 N.E. 924 (1928); France & Canada S.S. Corp. v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 229 N.Y. 89, 127 N.E. 893 (1920).
17. This Article deals only with limitation of liability clauses and not clauses in-.
volving a total immunity or a total disclaimer of liability. In situations involving total
immunity or disclaimers, there is authority against the principle of affirmance usually
due to the unequal bargaining power that such clauses often evidence. See, e.g., CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 1973); Agricultural Servs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co.,
551 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1977).
18. Slotkin v. Citizens Casualty Co., 447 F. Supp. 253, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Fitzgerald v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 290 N.Y. 376, 378-79, 49 N.E.2d 489, 492 (1943); Miller v.
Barber, 66 N.Y. 558, 564 (1876); Calderon v. Calderon, 193 Misc. 37, 38, 84 N.Y.S.2d 126,
127 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
19. 192 U.S. 232 (1904). Accord Gannett Co. v. Register Publishing Co., 428 F.
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party desires to rescind upon the ground of misrepresentation or
fraud, he must upon the discovery of the fraud announce his purpose and adhere to it. If he continues to treat the property as his
own the right of20rescission is gone, and the party will be held bound
by the contract.
In many cases, claimant-purchasers do not take any steps
whatever to rescind any of the contract in question or to tender back
any of the benefits received thereunder. 21 Instead, claimants elect
to affirm the contract and continue to use the object of the contract.
Acts of affirmance are demonstrated in many instances by (i) the
filing of the complaint or counter-claim itself which demands specific performance as well as damages, (ii) the claimant working with
the manufacturer to bring the system to a level of acceptability at
the same time the suit is progressing, (iii) the claimant's acknowledgement of obligations under the contract, such as payment of the
purchase price, rental or license fees or the like (or even if not paying such amounts recognizing and reserving such amounts on the
company's books), (iv) the claimant's rejection of defendant's offer
to repossess or repurchase all the interests of the claimant at cost,
and (v) the purchaser's failure to reject, revoke its acceptance or return the computer system to the manufacturer with the purchaser
continuing to use the system.
This affirmation of the contract by purchasers unquestionably
results from a determination by the purchasers that it is more in
their economic interest to retain the contract in an effort to earn
profits rather than to rescind the arrangement and forego use of the
contract object. In many cases the purchaser clearly profits from
continued use of the computer systems but the weight of authority
holds that having affirmed the contract, claimants must accept the
burdens, as well as the benefits, of the contract. Specifically, claimants are then bound by all of the contract provisions including the
limitation on liability.
Supp. 818 (D. Conn. 1977). As noted above, current statutes pertaining to rescission
permit the recovery of damages in addition to rescission.
20. 192 U.S. at 242.
21. Rescission claims and tender offers are often omitted from the complaint for
fear that the alleged defrauding party may accept the tender offer. Additionally, rescission may be complicated in those situations where the object of a contract is sold
to a third party and leased back to the contracting party. In such a case the owner
may not wish to disgorge his interest and the concommitant investment credit tax
advantage.

19821

B. CONTRACT

COMPUTER LITIGATION
AFFIRMANCE PRECLUDES PARTIAL RESCISSION

In Merry Realty Co. v. Shamokin & Hollis Real Estate Co.,22 the
New York Court of Appeals held that "[if] rescission is the remedy
selected it must be in whole and not in part. If there be an affirm23
ance it must be of all the terms and conditions of the transaction."
The law mirrors common sense and does not permit claimant purchasers to affirm only as much of the contract as pleases them and
24
disaffirm that which is not to their liking.
This principle was applied in Leav v. Weitzner.25 In Leav, the
plaintiffs sued for damages arising out of fraudulent misrepresentations allegedly made to induce the plaintiffs to enter into a lease
with the defendant. The lease contained a clause under which both
parties waived trial by jury in any action "arising out of or in any
way connected with this lease." The court held that in suing for
damages, the plaintiffs had affirmed the lease and, therefore, could
22. 230 N.Y. 316, 323, 130 N.E. 306, 313 (1921). See also Throckmorton v. Johnson,
232 A.D. 495, 497, 250 N.Y.S. 426, 428 (1931), where the court stated: "It is equally deftnitely established that when a rescission is asserted it must be in whole and not in
part ... the plaintiffs may not rescind a part of the transaction and enforce that part
which is of value to them." See also Thompson v. Thompson, 232 A.D. 488, 497, 250
N.Y.S. 433, 439 (1931), affid, 258 N.Y. 626, 180 N.E. 362 (1932). The same rule was announced long ago in Masson v. Bovet, 1 Denio 69, 74 (N.Y. 1845), where the court held
the plaintiff "cannot hold on to such part of the contract as may be desirable on his
part, and avoid the residue, but must rescind in toto, if at all." Id. There is authority,
however, that "affirmance of the contract is not necessarily affirmance and ratification
of the fraud inducing it." 422 West 15th St., Inc. v. Estate of Johnson, 258 A.D. 227, 228,
16 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1939).
23. 230 N.Y. 316, 323, 130 N.E. 306, 313 (1921) (emphasis added).
24. See Angerosa v. White Co., 248 A.D. 425, 428, 290 N.Y.S. 204, 209 (1936), affd,
275 N.Y. 524, 11 N.E.2d 652 (1937), where the court stated that "by electing to affirm
the contract and seeking to enforce it, appellant adopted that which is detrimental as
well as that which is beneficial." Id. See also Security Underground Storage, Inc. v.
Anderson, 347 F.2d 964 (10th Cir. 1965); Big Chief Sales Co. v. Lowe, 178 Kan. 33, 283
P.2d 480 (1955); Bell v. Keepers, 39 Kan. 105, 17 P. 785 (1888); United States v. Idlewild
Pharmacy, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 19, 23 (E.D. Va. 1969), where the court stated:
One entitled to relief can affirm or avoid the contract, but he cannot do both;
if he adopts a part, he adopts it all. He must reject it entirely if he desires to
obtain relief. Defendant cannot accept the benefits of the contract and then
assert he is entitled to be relieved of its obligations. His action was a confirmation of the contract and a waiver of any alleged misrepresentation, mistake, fraud or other wrong. The time for him to demand relief is upon the
discovery of the alleged misrepresentations.
25. 268 A.D. 466, 51 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1944). See also Pratt v. Trustees of the Sailors'
Snug Harbor, 19 Misc. 2d 551, 189 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1959); Caplan v. Goldman, 197 Misc.
404, 95 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1950). But see International Roofing Corp. v. Van der Veer, 43
Misc. 2d 93, 250 N.Y.S.2d 387 (1964); Federal Housecraft, Inc. v. Faria, 28 Misc. 2d 155,
216 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1961).
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26
not at the same time deny the lease provision waiving a jury trial.
Similarly, in Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co.,27
under contracts guaranteeing product yields and performance characteristics, Commonwealth, the plaintiff-appellee, acquired a large
oil refinery that had been designed, built and placed in operation by
the defendant-appellant. Once erected, the refinery encountered severe difficulties with power consumption and its steam and water
cooling systems. Dissatisfied with the plant, the plaintiff claimed
fraudulent inducement, and sued for approximately twice the
amount invested in plant construction. The court was then faced
with the issue of whether the plaintiff, which had not rescinded the
contract, was entitled to avoid the contract clause requiring arbitration of "any controversy or claim arising out of or related to this
Agreement" via a "just and equitable" partial rescission.
Applying New York law, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the arbitration clause was binding absent any showing
28
that the individual clause had itself been induced by fraud.
Since Lummus was decided, the principal New York case relied
upon in Lummus for the conclusion that New York would not apply
a separability analysis to the arbitration issue, has been overruled. 29
With the exception of the separability of an arbitration clause, how-

26. The court stated:
In asserting a claim for damages resulting from the execution of the
lease, the plaintiffs necessarily affirm its existence and maintain the action
on the theory that the defendants' fraud resulted in a subsisting contract
which, on account of the falsity of the representations, is detrimental to
them. Under these circumstances, the plaintiffs are not in a position to contend, as they might perhaps contend in an action for rescission, that the stipulation waiving a jury trial perished with all the other rights and obligations
under the lease ....
In pursuing their remedy for damages, they necessarily
affirm the existence of the lease from which the damages ensue.... They
may not at the same time rely upon the lease as the foundation of their claim
for damages and repudiate the provisions by which they waived their constitutional right to a jury trial.
268 A.D. at 468, 51 N.Y.S.2d at 777. See also Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc.,
539 F. Supp. 402 (D. Colo. 1982).
27. 280 F.2d 915 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 911 (1960).
28. 280 F.2d at 928. See also Housekeeper v. Lourie, 39 A.D.2d 280, 333 N.Y.S.2d 932
(1972), appeal dismissed, 32 N.Y.2d 832, 345 N.Y.S.2d 271, 299 N.E.2d 261 (1973).
29. Matter of Weinrott, 32 N.Y.2d 190, 298 N.E.2d 61, 334 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1973), rev'g
Matter of Wrap-Vertiser Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 17, 143 N.E.2d 366, 163 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1957) (a
court may consider the arbitration issue independently of the fraud claims and, even
where there is rescission, apply the arbitration clause). See also Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Nuclear Installation Serv. Co. v. Nuclear
Serv. Corp., 468 F. Supp. 1187 (E.D. Pa. 1979). Generally, arbitration clauses are supported by public policy. See Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), where
separability appears limited solely to arbitration clauses and does not have the affect
of avoiding the clause but instead applying it.
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ever, the general principles addressed in the Lummus case continue
to be applicable.
C.

APPLICABILrTY OF CONTRACT TERMS

The terms and conditions sought to be avoided by the purchaser
are often those limiting the financial liability of the manufacturer.
Generally, a purchaser's damage claims arise out of alleged defects
or malfunctions in the object of the contract.
The sales contract will often provide for such possibilities and
establish limitations on the manufacturer's liabilities in the event
that one of these possibilities occurs. The purchaser's assertions of
"fraud" are an attempt to avoid those contractual limitations while
preserving to the purchaser all of the benefits of the contract.
In arriving at their contractual arrangements, the parties often
have foreseen and anticipated the possible occurrence of these
events, that is, the failure of the system to meet all of the purchaser's asserted needs or the failure of the system to achieve the
performance guarantees set forth in the agreement, as well as faults
in development, design or construction. Accordingly, the parties
have determined, in view of those possibilities, that the responsibility of the manufacturer should be defined and written into the contract to be executed by the parties and that one of the contractual
provisions should be a limitation of the manufacturer's liability.
The resulting limitation provisions are the outcome of bargaining negotiations, or the recognition of recurring problems, and are
drafted and designed to deal with the fact that problems might hamper the achievement of the desired goals.
If the computer system or other project is a failure, purchasers
will rescind. In most instances, however, the computer system is at
least moderately or potentially successful. It is clearly the prospect
of profit and other economic benefit that leads claimant to proceed
with the contract rather than rescind. Having made that determination, even with knowledge of the alleged fraud practiced, the purchaser must accept the contract limitations that are designed to deal
with the problems encountered.
D. CONTRACT AFFIRMANCE BINDs PARTIES To LiABaIrrY
LIMrrATION CLAUSES

The soundness of the above position is established by Soviero
Bros. Contracting Corp. v. City of New York. 30 In Soviero, a con30. 286 A.D. 435, 142 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1955), fold, 2 N.Y.2d 924, 141 N.E.2d 918, 161
N.Y.S.2d 888 (1957). Cf. Bankers Trust Co. v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 282 F.2d 106
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struction contractor, aware that the City of New York had misrepresented site conditions, affirmed its contract, proceeded with
construction, and then sued for damages arising out of the alleged
misrepresentations. The contract contained a provision requiring
the commencement of an action upon "any claim arising out of or
based upon this contract or by reason of any act or omission or requirement of the City" within one year after a specified date.3 1 The
contractor commenced his action after expiration of the one year period. Noting that the contractor had made no effort to rescind, the
court observed: "Presumably, the contractor wished to retain the
profits of these contracts, and to look only to damages for the misrepresentations, rather than to rescind, risk his profits, and be limited to damages measured by benefits conferred. '32 Thus, since the
plaintiff "did not rescind, but proceeded with the contracts under
protest," 33 the court held the contractor bound by the contractual
limitation of one year for bringing any suit for damages resulting
from fraudulent inducement.3 It rejected the contractor's reliance
on other cases dealing with total immunity clauses and distin35
guished them from those providing for a reasonable limitation.
(9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 822 (1961). See also IBM Corp. v. Catamore
Enter., 548 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1976).
31. Contractual limitations upon the time period in which to commence an action
are specifically sanctioned in U.C.C. § 2-725(1), provided that the period is not less
than one year.
32. 286 A.D. at 439-40, 142 N.Y.S.2d at 512.
33. Id. at 439, 142 N.Y.S.2d at 511.
34. Id. at 441-42, 142 N.Y.S.2d at 513. But see Bankers Trust Co. v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 282 F.2d 106 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 822 (1961). In Bankers,
the Ninth Circuit, without considering the affIrmance point, held that the contractual
limitation on the time for bringing suit did not control in a fraud action.
35. The court stated:
The contractor relies upon a well-settled line of cases which told that one
who is guilty of fraud in the making of a written agreement may not invoke a
provision of that agreement which purports, directly or indirectly for his own
fraud ....
Each of these cases was an action for damages brought at law
based upon the misrepresentations made in the inducement of the contract ....
These cases apply a rule well recognized in law that avoids the effect of an immunity clause, the very existence of which arises only because
the contract containing it was induced by fraud and which provision is
designed [emphasis in original] to shield the fraud. A total immunity clause
is bad; a limitationprovision, if reasonable,is not. [emphasis added].
286 A.D. at 441, 142 N.Y.S.2d at 512-13. See also Orlando v. Berkeley, 220 Cal. App. 2d
224, 33 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1963); Goldsmith v. National Container Corp., 287 N.Y. 438, 40
N.E.2d 242 (1942); Bridger v. Goldsmith, 143 N.Y. 424, 38 N.E. 458 (1894); Cohen v. Cohen, 1 A.D.2d 586, 151 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1956), affd, 3 N.Y.2d 813, 144 N.E.2d 649, 166
N.Y.S.2d 10 (1957); Mosler Holding Corp. v. Bell, 10 Misc. 2d 681, 31 N.Y.S. 790 (1957).
The Soviero court pointed out that where total immunity clauses are voided, this result does not derive from a claim of fraudulent inducement, but is instead based upon
considerations of public policy.
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As noted earlier, 36 other reasonable limitations on the assertion
of fraud claims also have been upheld. A party charging fraudulent
inducement, for example, cannot, after affirmance, avoid a contract
37
provision that provides that disputes be determined by arbitration,
nor that the dispute be determined without a jury.38 Indeed, the
New York courts have held that a party affirming a contract may be
entirely barred from asserting a claim for fraudulent inducement
when, by the terms of the contract, he has expressly contracted
reliance on the specific representations later
away his right to claim 39
said to have been false.
Only a few cases, however, have considered a limitation of liability/damage clause in an affirmed contract later claimed to have
°
been fraudulently induced. 4 In Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp.,41
In truth, the rule rests not so much on the basis that the immunity provision
may be avoided for fraud in the inducement of the contract, but on the principle that the provision is illegal, and therefore null, because it violates public
policy ....
Consequently, the provision never had any life. It requires
neither the existence of fraud nor rescission to destroy it. It is void in the
beginning.
286 A.D. at 441, 142 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
36. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
37. Id.
38. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
39. See Dannan Realty Corp. v. Harris, 5 N.Y.2d 317, 157 N.E.2d 597, 184 N.Y.S.2d
599 (1959). See also Holm v. Shilensky, 269 F. Supp. 359, 364-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aO'd
on other grounds, 388 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1968). Any such disclaimer of reliance provision, however, must be clear and unequivocal. Id.
40. To the extent that support for the enforceability of liquidated damages
clauses and clauses limiting liability as to consequential damages is derived from
general principles of law not involving a claim of fraudulent inducement, see
N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-718 (McKinney 1982) (liquidation or limitation of damages); N.Y.U.C.C.
§ 2-719(3) (McKinney 1982) (limitation or exclusion of consequential damages); Farris Eng'g Corp. v. Service Bureau Corp., 406 F.2d 519 (3rd Cir. 1969) (principles governing enforcement of provisions absolving a contract party from his own negligent
acts); U.S. Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 449, 460 (E.D. Mich.
1972), affrd, 509 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1975) ("Both parties realized that its purpose was
to allocate the risks associated with this type of transaction."); County Asphalt, Inc. v.
Lewis Welding & Eng'g Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300, 1308-09 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 444 F.2d 372
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971) (discussion of circumstances when exclusion of consequential damages may be regarded as unconscionable under Ohio
law and where the court stated that "plaintifrs experience and expertise, and the parties' care in negotiating these large contracts, preclude any argument of unfair surprise"); Rogers v. Dorchester Assoc., 32 N.Y.2d 553, 300 N.E.2d 403, 347 N.Y.S.2d 22
(1973) (holding that limitations upon that consequential damages must be narrowly
construed); Melodee Lane Lingerie Co. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 18 N.Y.2d 57, 281
N.E.2d 661, 271 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966); Van Dyke Prod., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12
N.Y.2d 301, 189 N.E.2d 693, 239 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1963); Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, 10
N.Y.2d 294, 177 N.E.2d 925, 220 N.Y.S.2d 962 (1961); Mosler Safe Co. v. Maiden Lane
Safe Deposit Co., 199 N.Y. 479, 93 N.E. 81 (1910); H.G. Metals, Inc. v. Wells Fargo
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the Seventh Circuit held a contract clause excluding consequential
damages valid even though the plaintiff claimed fraudulent inducement. In dictum and applying Maryland law, the District Court in
Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.42 interpreted a broadly drafted limitation of liability clause which applied
to claims "under this contract, whether in tort, under any warranty,
or otherwise" to preclude recovery of damages for misrepresentation. The court had earlier found that no cause of action for fraud or
deceit was supported by the evidence.
In Waterman-Bic Pen Corp. v. L.E. Waterman Pen Co.,43 both
the New York Supreme Court and the Appellate Division held that
plaintiff's affirmance of the contract made the limitation clause
"binding," but the Appellate Division stated that construction of that
particular clause was a triable issue and it should not be construed
at an early stage of the proceeding to limit defendants' liability for
the alleged fraud.
The Waterman-Bic rulings resulted from an application to vacate a warrant of attachment which, under the then applicable law,
was authorized in an action "for money only" when fraud was
claimed. The plaintiff had purchased a business from defendants
giving in payment shares in a corporation formed to take over the
business. The contract provided that "any decrease in value of the
inventory and of the accounts receivable not in excess of $150,000
'
will not be deemed to constitute a breach of warrant[y]."4
It further provided that, if the deficiency in inventory or receivables exceeded $150,000, the sellers should either pay the amount of such
deficiency in cash or surrender to plaintiff shares in the corporation
in prescribed amounts. Finding the accounts receivable materially
Alarm Services, 45 A.D.2d 490, 493, 359 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (1974); Mokar Properties
Corp. v. Hall, 6 A.D.2d 536, 179 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1958) (principles governing enforceability
of liquidated damages clauses); De Leeuw v. Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., 277 A.D. 1055
(1950); Mutual Ins. Co. v. Fire Alarm, 90 Misc. 2d 517, 154 N.Y.S. 919 (1977). See also
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1974) (valid
exculpatory clause limiting liability to contractual warranty provisions held to encompass negligence and strict liability in tort in a case involving defective aircraft
nosegear); Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. RJ. Eastrom Corp., 364 F. Supp. 1063 (W.D.
Pa. 1973) (holding that it was not against public policy to permit corporate seller to
disclaim liability on basis of negligence and strict liability in tort in sale to corporate
buyer that took place only after extensive negotiations as to contract terms).
41. 508 F.2d 603, 617 (7th Cir. 1975). But see American Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
42. 385 F. Supp. 572, 576 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 527 F.2d 853 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
43. 8 A.D.2d 378, 187 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1959), rev'g, 19 Misc. 2d 421, 190 N.Y.S.2d 48
(1959).
44. 19 Misc. 2d at 422, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
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deficient after closing the transaction, plaintiff affirmed the contract,
sued for fraudulent inducement, sought money damages and obtained an attachment. Special Term vacated the attachment holding
that the contract provided a self-executing
remedy and that the ac'4 5
tion was not one for "money only.
The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the attachment
holding that plaintiff had made a sufficient primafacie showing of
fraud and that defendants had "failed to demonstrate that plaintiff
cannot ultimately succeed" and that the action was indeed one for
money only. That court noted that the plaintiff was claiming that
"many of the accounts receivable did not represent actual sales, and
were overstated by more than $300,000, and that other assets and liabilities were also misstated." 46
The Appellate Division explicitly held that affirmance of the
contract had made the limitation clause "binding." However, characterizing the clause as one applicable to a decrease in accounts receivable that might occur "in the regular course of business," the
court expressed doubt whether the clause would give immunity
where such accounts "were completely nonexistent, fraudulent or
fictitious," stating that the clause should not be read that broadly "at
this stage." The court clearly was leaving open the possibility of a
determination at trial, based upon all the relevant evidence, that the
47
clause was applicable to plaintiff's claims.
In a computer case, National Cash Register Co. v. Modern Transfer Co.,4 a manufacturer sued a buyer that refused to take delivery
or pay for a computer system and the buyer asserted counterclaims
alleging fraud. The court held, without extensive analysis, that a
45. Id.
46. 8 A.D.2d at 379, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
47. Id. The court continued:
In purchasing defendant's business plaintiff agreed to assume the risk of
limited variations in the stated value of the accounts receivable which might
occur prior to the takeover date in the regular course of business. While alleging that it was fraudulently induced to enter into the agreements, plaintiff
has elected to affirm the contracts. Although binding, defendants have not
clearly demonstrated that the contractual provisions limiting liability can be
applied to anything other than normal business risks inherent in the collection of accounts, such as bad debts, returns, setoffs, disputes, and adjustments. The provisions should not, at this stage, be read so broadly as to give
defendants immunity even for accounts which were completely nonexistent,
fraudulent, or fictitious, endowing them with a limited license to defraud with
impunity. Implicit in exculpatory provisions limiting liability is the requirement of good faith ....
Furthermore, the claim for damages is based in part
on other items of misrepresentations as to which the limitation provisions
have no application.

Id.
48. 224 Pa. Super. 138, 302 A.2d 486 (1973).
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limitation of liability clause of the contract (excluding consequential
damages) was applicable and thereby dismissed the buyer's counterclaims based upon fraud.
Several cases, however, have held limitation of liability provisions inapplicable. In one early computer case, Clements Auto Co. v.
Service Bureau Corp.,49 the plaintiff purchaser entered into a series
of contracts with a subsidiary of IBM for computer goods and services that were to be used in inventory control. Each of the contracts
The contracts also
was terminable by either party on 30 days notice.
50
contained a limitation of liability provision.
The contractual relationship began in 1963 and was terminated
in January 1967 by the plaintiff purchaser. In this period there were
three generations of inventory reports based upon input material
from the accounting and billing procedures which also had been automated by the defendant. The plaintiff purchaser brought the action in September 1967 proceeding on the theories of rescission,
breach of implied warranty, breach of contract, reformation and
fraudulent misrepresentation. The trial court found that the defendant had made fraudulent misrepresentations and granted damages
for the period from 1963 to October 1966, but denied recovery on all
other grounds. In doing so the trial court found that the limitation
or misrepreof liability provisions did not limit recovery for fraud
5
sentation under the governing law of the contracts. '
On appeal, the defendant argued, inter alia, first that the actionable representations were in the nature of innocent misrepresenta49. 298 F. Supp. 115 (D. Minn. 1969), affid in part rev'd in part, 444 F.2d 169 (8th
Cir. 1971).
50. The contract stated that the purchaser's "liability with respect to this agreement is limited to the total charge for the services provided herein and no special or
consequential damages may be recovered." 444 F.2d at 188.
51. The court cited Channel Master Corp. v. Aluminum Ltd. Sales, Inc., 4 N.Y.2d
403, 151 N.E.2d 833, 176 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1958) and Lyman v. Romboli, 293 Mass. 373, 199
N.E. 910 (1936). Channel Master states that a cause of action for fraud is entirely independent of the contractual relations between the parties. In Lyman, the plaintiff
was fraudulently induced to enter a lease by representations that he could use what
was represented as defendants' land for a driveway. Actually, the land was owned by
the state. The lease provided if the lessee was hampered or prevented from having
such a driveway he could terminate the lease. The trial court held that this term precluded recovery. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed holding:
This provision does not show that the plaintiff did not rely on the representations. The judge apparently thought that it constituted a contractual substitute for any right of action for deceit. But it was settled by Granlund v.

Sarafthat an attempt by a contract to restrict the remedy of a party for fraud
of the other party which induced the making of the contract, is ineffectual.
Id. at 374-75.
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tions, 52 and second that the representations were not included in
the contracts, were not express warranties, and contractual disclaimers negated all implied warranties. The defendent further argued that innocent misrepresentations were equivalent to
warranties, either express or implied, and that in a commercial context they should be governed by the same contract principles, that
is, the Uniform Commercial Code. The defendant also interposed
the limitation of liability provisions. The Eighth Circuit rejected
these contentions finding that the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code did not alter the law of fraud and that a general contract
disclaimer was ineffective to negate reliance on innocent misrepresentations. 53 It further found that under Minnesota law, a limitation
of liability clause was ineffective in an action for fraud. The court
stated:
Minnesota's strong policy of providing an effective remedy in
fraud would be substantially undermined were we to give effect to
this severe restriction on the amount of liability. Having previously
held that Minnesota would not give effect to a contract provision
which would negate the fact of liability, we believe it inconsistent to
hold that the court 54
would then give effect to a provision limiting the
amount of liability.
The reasoning of the Eight Circuit, therefore, while not directly contrary, is somewhat inconsistent with the law of New York as expressed in Soviero. In Clements, however, the plaintiff had
terminated the relationship and thereafter used another data
processing service. Therefore, it did not continue to accrue benefits
under any contract or otherwise affirm the contract. This is a substantial and key distinguishing factor. In effect, because of the factual circumstances, the court did not analyze the indicia of
affirmance of the contract or the applicable legal principles. Similarly, other computer cases which have stated that contractual limi52. Actionable fraud in Minnesota requires traditional scienter. The trial court
found misrepresentations which the defendant "either knew to be false or, which is
more likely, asserted as of its own knowledge without knowing whether they were

true or false." 298 F. Supp. at 131.
53. The court did cut back the period used for computation of damages, finding
that after April, 1965, the plaintiff was fully aware of the problem and could no longer
rely on the misrepresentations. It noted that "we do not believe and [defendant]
does not argue, that [plaintiffs] actions constitute a waiver of fraud for damages incurred to this point." 444 F.2d at 186 n.11. In short, while the Clements court permitted the plaintiff to collect damages accrued after learning of the fraud while it sought
a buyer for the unprofitable business, the court refused to allow an increase in damages for additional expenditures on the property retained after the discovery of the
fraud. See also Lane v. Midwest Bankshares Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1200 (D. Ark. 1972)
(failure to disavow contract soon enough defeated securities fraud claim).
54. 444 F.2d at 188.
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tations of liability would be ineffective against a finding of fraud do
not involve the elements of affirmance or consideration of that
issue. 55
An analysis similar to that in Clements is found in Lamb v. Bangart.5 6 Lamb involved the sale by defendants of, inter alia, a onequarter interest in a contractually warranted bull for breeding purposes, which had been purchased for $50,000, and ten heifers, contractually warranted to be offspring of that bull, which were
purchased for $25,000. Plaintiff alleged that the bull was in poor
physical shape, was not a breeder, and had to be destroyed. The
jury found fraud by the defendants, and at trial plaintiffs recovered
damages for breach of contract and fraud. (The complaint count for
rescission was abandoned.) The Supreme Court of Utah rejected
the defendant's contention that a contract clause, defining liqui57
dated damages and limitations, provided the exclusive remedy.
The court held that such a remedy was merely optional unless it
was stated to be exclusive. More importantly, however, the court
held that application of a contract clause limiting liability would be
against public policy.58 Although Clements and Lamb are factually
distinguishable, these cases stand for the proposition that because a
55. See, e.g., APLications Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 501 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (the factual indicia of affirmance were not present). The trial court in APLications found that the defendant had made no false representations. See APLications
Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 672 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1982).
Additionally, the issue of affirmance was not considered directly by the First Circuit in IBM Corp. v. Catamore Enter., 548 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1976), because the court's
attention was focused on the application of a subsequent written agreement to prior
oral agreements. Citing Soviero the court did hold that a contractual period of limitations was applicable in the face of allegations of fraud. In a footnote comment, however, the court suggested that the trial court, through special interrogatories to the
jury, could have determined whether the agreement was "voidable," either in whole
or in part, by reason of fraud. Id. at 1068.
56. 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974).
57. The court summarized the contract provision as follows:
This paragraph contained a representation that the sellers had 1500
ampules of Fuyard 1st semen on hand on the date of the agreement. The paragraph provided that if the animal died prior to the buyers acquiring 750
ampules, the sellers and buyers would adjust the quantity so that each would
have an equal amount. It further provided that if the animal died prior to the
buyers receiving 1500 ampules of semen and the payment of $30,000 on January 5, 1969, was not due, the buyers would be exonerated from such payment.
Id. at 608.
58. The court explained:
In the instant action, in addition to there being no provision that paragraph 4 provided the exclusive remedy, a contract clause limiting liability will
not be applied in a fraud action. The law does not permit a covenant of immunity which will protect a person against his own fraud on the ground of
public policy. A contract limitation on damages or remedies is valid only in
the absence of allegations or proof of fraud.
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total immunity provision will not be applied, a partial limitation also
will not be applied. As such, these cases are contrary to the New
York cases dealing with partial immunity which have been held not
void as against any public policy. Both the exclusion of "consequential or indirect damage" 59 and specific limitations of liability are
reasonable in the light of the usual liabilities assumed and the acknowledged risks involved in any venture.
There is nothing in the nature of limitation of liability clauses to
distinguish them from clauses compelling arbitration such as those
in LuMmus 60 and Housekeeper,61 or from a clause waiving jury trial
such as that in Leav, 62 or from a clause imposing a short statute of
limitations as in Soviero63 which would dictate that the result
should be any different.

E. WAIVER
A related concept is waiver of the fraud by a party's conduct
subsequent to the discovery of the alleged fraud.64 This argument
Id. The court cited the decision of the Eighth Circuit in Clements and Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966).
59. The exclusion of "indirect" damages such as lost profits or lost production is
nothing more than a contractual statement of the liability limitations imposed by the
New York law of damages for fraud. The New York Court of Appeals has repeatedly
made clear that the New York measure of damages for fraudulent inducement is indemnification for the actual pecuniary loss suffered by the claimant as the direct result of the wrong, and that such direct damages are measured by the difference
between consideration given and the value of the benefits, assets or services received
from the fraudulently induced transaction and from which all elements of profit are
excluded. The definitive and leading authority on this point is Reno v. Bull, 226 N.Y.
546, 124 N.E. 144 (1919).
This rule has been cited over the years and has been applied in a variety of cases.
Foster v. DiPaolo, 236 N.Y. 132, 140 N.E. 220 (1923); Hotaling v. A.B. Leach & Co., 247
N.Y. 84, 159 N.E. 870 (1928); Sager v. Friedman, 270 N.Y. 472, 1 N.E.2d 971 (1936); Ross
v. Preston, 292 N.Y. 433, 55 N.E.2d 490 (1944); Hanlon v. MacFadden Publications, Inc.,
302 N.Y. 502, 99 N.E.2d 546 (1951). See also Toho Bussan Kaisha, Ltd. v. American
President Lines, Ltd., 265 F.2d 418 (2nd Cir. 1959).
60. Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 280 F.2d 915 (lst Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 911 (1960).
61. Housekeeper v. Lourie, 39 A.D.2d 280, 333 N.Y.S.2d 932, appeal dismissed, 32
N.Y.2d 832, 299 N.E.2d 261, 345 N.Y.S.2d 271 (1973).
62. Leav v. Weitzner, 268 A.D. 466, 51 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1944).
63. Soviero Bros. Contracting Corp. v. City of New York, 286 A.D. 435, 142 N.Y.S.2d
508 (1955), affd, 2 N.Y.2d 924, 141 N.E.2d 189, 161 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1957).
64. See generally Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 808 (1949); Annot., 106 A.LR. 172 (1937); Elwood v. Tiemair, 91 Kan. 842, 139 P. 362 (1914); St. John v. Hendrickson, 81 Ind. 350
(1882). In St. John, a waiver of the right to maintain an action for damages for fraudulent inducement was found on the basis of plaintiffls failure to have repudiated a
transaction known to be fraudulent. The court recognized the general rule that a
party may stand by his bargain and sue for damages resulting from fraud and held:
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would have to be predicated on conduct by the plaintiffs which
showed that the cause of action for damages was intended to be
65
waived.
In its broadest form, the rule is that in order to avoid a waiver of
the right to damages, the defrauded party must remain at arm's
length; he must on his part comply with the terms of the contract;
the conhe must not ask favors of the other party or offer to perform
66
tract only on conditions which he had no right to exact.
The factual hurdles of establishing a waiver, however, are substantial and it is difficult to convince a fact-finder of the merits of
such a position. More importantly, however, the commencement of
an action at the time of discovery of the fraud would defeat such a
claim whereas commencement of an action does not defeat the affirmance theory. In fact, the post-complaint activity of the complainant is central to the affirmance theory.

F. SUMMARY OF FACTUAL DEFENSE POSTURE
The factual defense posture of affirmance of the contractual limitations of liability may be summarized as follows: While claimantpurchasers may complain that it is, in their view, unfair that they
should be bound by the liability limiting clauses of the contracts,
they are bound as a result of their own plan and design. Claimants
cannot deny their own knowledge and belief of the alleged fraud
"[wle do decide that where a party with full knowledge declines to repudiate a transaction known to him to be fraudulent, and fully and expressly ratifies it, he can
neither rescind nor maintain an action for damages." Id. at 354. The basis of the decision was that plaintiff, after learning of the true financial condition of the partnership in which he had invested, declined an offer to be released from the partnership
by other partners who had allegedly induced it. Id.
Some courts flnd waiver of the right to sue for damages on the basis of an election to proceed while the contract is still substantially executory. Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Rau Constr. Co., 130 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1942); Simon v. Good Year Metallic Rubber Shoe Co., 105 F. 473 (6th Cir. 1900). On the failure to voice objections as to
claimed invalidity for a long peiod of time, see United States v. Idlewild Pharmacy,
Inc., 308 F. Supp. 19 (E.D. Va. 1969). In many courts the question is treated as an issue of law. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Rau Constr. Co., 130 F.2d 499 (8th Cir.
1942); Simon v. Good Year Metallic Rubber Shoe Co., 105 F. 473 (6th Cir. 1900). In
other cases, however, it is an issue of fact to be established at trial. Towers Realty
Corp. v. Fox, 278 A.D. 74, 103 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1951); 422 W. 15th St., Inc. v. Estate of Johnson, 258 A.D. 227, 16 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1939); Mercogliano Lumber Corp. v. Sea Cliff
Homes, Inc., 31 Misc. 2d 1078, 221 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1961); duPont v. Perot, 59 F.R.D. 404
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
65. See Honegger v. Parador Enter., Inc., 71 A.D.2d 877, 419 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1979).
66. Schmidt v. Mesmer, 166 Cal. 267, 48 P. 54 (1897); Conzelmann v. Northwest
Poultry &Dairy Prods. Co., 190 Ore. 332, 225 P.2d 757 (1950); Benz v. Zobel, 255 Wis.
542, 39 N.W.2d 713 (1949).
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prior to filing a lawsuit or counterclaim and their election to stand
by the contract. They cannot deny their continuing intent thereafter
to retain and reap the benefits of the computer systems the
purchase of which they claim to have been fraudulently induced.
Furthermore, they cannot deny that they declined an opportunity to
rescind the alleged fraudulent transaction and thereby to be made
whole. They cannot deny that, but for the alleged fraudulent inducement, they never would have come to possess the very computer systems which generates their current and potential profits.
By such conduct, claimant-purchasers have implicitly chosen to
accept all of the benefits of the contracts in suit and, thereby, to accept the reasonable limitations on the liability of manufacturers for
the failures and deficiencies of which claimants would complain.
I.

PLAINTIFF'S DUTY TO INVESTIGATE

The application of limitation of liability clauses affects the purchaser's right to damages. In the litigation setting, a defensive attack on the damages claimed is bolstered by a complimentary attack
on the liability elements. Accordingly, a qualified defensive measure which might be appropriate in any fraud case concerns the extent of the claimant's knowledge from its own investigation or lack
of knowledge of the facts arising out of a failure to investigate and
its reliance on the alleged misrepresentations or concealments. To
prove fraud, the claimant must prove its reliance on the misrepresentations and that its reliance was reasonable.
As such this defense is an attack on the reliance element of
fraud and is based upon the claimant's qualified duty and failure to
investigate the facts. 67 In the computer context the defense may be
particularly appropriate in many cases because of the degree of sophistication of the customer and the customer's capabilities and re67. For a time, the defense attack based on a claimant's failure to investigate was
sidetracked in the conceptual pigeonhole of contributory negligence, particularly in
securities fraud actions. See Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 104
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971). In federal securities law the defense
was referred to as plaintiffs duty of due diligence or due care. See Wheeler, Plaintiffs Duty of Due Care Under Rule 10b-5: An Implied Defense To An Implied Remedy,
70 Nw. U.L REv. 561 (1975); Note, The Due Diligence Requirement for Plaintiff Under
Rule lob-5; 1975 DUKE L.J. 753 (1975); Note, Reliance Under Rule lob-5. Is the "Reasonable Investor" Reasonable?,72 COLUM. L REv. 562 (1972). This development occurred
because plaintiffs were asserting that negligence constituted scienter. The United
States Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, however, prescribed that under the federal securities fraud case, scienter was required and was
not satisfied by negligent conduct. The Hochfelder decision refocused the defense
contention and returned it to the proper classification of an attack on the reliance element of fraud.
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sources to investigate thoroughly. For example, in APLications Inc.
v. Hewlett-PackardCo. ,6 the trial court found that the plaintiff company's president possessed a sophisticated knowledge of computer
technology, had seen repeated demonstrations of the computer
hardware, and had received training on the computer hardware.
Consequently, the court held that the plaintiff had not relied upon
advertising literature or other statements and "did not exercise due
care" in investigating the system for defects. The court concluded
that the "case should never have been brought" for trial. General
common law principles support this defense in appropriate
situations.
A.

MISREPRESENTATION

In order to recover for fraudulent misrepresentation, claimant's
reliance on the representation must have been justifiable under the
circumstances. 69 Historically, the doctrine of caveat emptor mandated the claimant's duty of inquiry. The retrenchment from that
doctrine, which was occasioned by the desire to promote commercial dealing, led to the general rule that the recipient of an inten70
tional misrepresentation had no duty to investigate. The principle
71
is phrased by section 540 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as
68. 501 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 (1977); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 108 at 715 (4th ed. 1970); Robitzek v. Reliance Intercontinental Corp., 7 A.D.2d
407, 183 N.Y.S.2d 870, a#7d, 7 N.Y.2d 1041, 167 N.E.2d 74, 200 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1959); Hobart
v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 159 P.2d 958 (1945). Generally the "substantial
factor" test is applied to the causation element of reliance. See, e.g., Wennerholm v.
Stanford Univ. School of Medicine, 20 Cal. 2d 713, 717, 128 P.2d 522, 525 (1942) where
the court stated:
In actions for fraud it is not required that a defendant's representations be
the sole cause of damage. If they are a substantial factor in inducing the
plaintiff to act, even though he also relies in part upon the advice of others,
reliance is sufficiently shown.
Id.
70. The lack of a duty to investigate leads to the general provision that in a case
of actual fraud, defendants are not entitled to an affirmative defense of lack of due
care on the part of plaintiff. Cousineau v. Walker, 613 P.2d 608 (Alaska 1980) (holding
that there is no defense of lack of due care but recognizing a split of authority on the
issue of a duty to investigate); Winn v. McCulloch Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 663, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 597 (1967) ("Negligence in reliance upon a misrepresentation is not a defense
where the misrepresentation was intentionally made to induce reliance upon it.");
Civille v. Bullis, 209 Cal. App. 2d 134, 25 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1962); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust
& Say. Ass'n v. Greenbach, 98 Cal. App. 2d 220, 223, 219 P.2d 814, 816 (1950); Letellier v.
Small, 400 A.2d 371 (Me. 1979); Galego v. Knudsen, 282 Ore. 155, 578 P.2d 769 (1978).
71. The Council of the American Law Institute, however, supported modification
of the predecessor section which was virtually identical to read as follows:
The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is justified in relying upon its
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follows:
Duty to Investigate

[T] he recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation of fact is justified
the
in relying upon its truth, although he might have ascertained
72
falsity of the representation had he made an investigation.

In effect, claimant's negligence ordinarily is not a defense to inten73
tional fraud.
The representation, however, will not be held to be misleading if
75
it is obviously false 74 or specifically disclaimed.
If the facts represented are not matters peculiarly within the
party's knowledge, and the other party has the means available to
him of knowing, by the exercise of ordinarily intelligence, the truth
or the real quality of the subject of the representation, he must
make use of those means, or he will not be heard to complain he
truth without investigation, unless he knows or has reason to know of facts
which make his reliance unreasonable.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 540 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965). It reasoned as
follows:
The argument has revolved around the question of a plaintiff who has 'notice'
of something wrong. In other words, he knows enough to know that he cannot safely rely without investigating, although he does not definitely know
that the statement is false. 'Notice' runs all through the law, wherever the
question of justifiable reliance is involved. Even the purchaser of a negotiable instrument cannot take as a holder in due course if he has notice that
there is something wrong with it. The Reporter believes that the taker of a
misrepresentation of fact stands on no better footing, and that there should
be something about it in this Section.
Id. at 10.
72. Comment (a) to section 540 reads as follows:
The rule stated in this Section applies not only when an investigation would
involve an expenditure of effort and money out of proportion to the magnitude of the transaction, but also when it could be made without any considerable trouble or expense. Thus it is no defense to one who has made a
fraudulent statement about his financial position that his offer to submit his
books to examination is rejected. On the other hand, if a mere cursory glance
would have disclosed the falsity of the representation, its falsity is regarded
as obvious under the rule stated in § 541.
See also King v. Livingston Mfg. Co., 180 Ala. 118, 60 So. 143 (1912); Gallon v. Burns, 92
Conn. 39, 101 A. 504 (1917); Burger v. Calek, 37 Idaho 235, 215 P. 981 (1923); Hise v.
Thomas, 181 Iowa 700, 165 N.W. 38 (1917); Braley v. Powers, 92 Me. 203, 42 A. 362
(1898); Mignault v. Goldman, 234 Mass. 205, 125 N.E. 189 (1919); Haskell v. Starbird,
152 Mass. 117, 142 N.E. 695 (1890); Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich. 504, 202 N.W. 955
(1925); Judd v. Walker, 215 Mo. 312, 114 S.W. 979 (1908); McCandless v. Grensel, 103
Neb. 472, 172 N.W. 249 (1919); Currie v. Mallory, 185 N.C. 206, 116 S.E. 564 (1923);
Warne v. Finseth, 50 N.D. 347, 195 N.W. 573 (1923); Werline v. Aldred, 57 Okla. 381, 157
P. 305 (1916); Handy v. Waldron, 19 R.I. 618, 35 A. 884 (1896); Crompton v. Beedle &
Thomas, 83 Vt. 287, 75 A. 331 (1910).
73. W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 108 (4th ed. 1970).
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 541 (1977).
75. Landale Enter., Inc. v. Berry, 676 F.2d 506 (11th Cir. 1982); Danann Realty
Corp. v. Harris, 5 N.Y,2d 317, 157 N.E.2d 597, 184 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1959).
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76
was induced to enter into the transaction by misrepresentations.
The recipient of fraudulent information is "required to use his
senses and cannot recover if he blindly relies upon the misrepresentation. '77 As the United States Supreme Court stated in 1903 in
Shappirov. Goldberg:
When the means of knowledge are open and at hand or furnished to
the purchaser or his agent and no effort is made to prevent the
party from using them, and especially where the purchaser undertakes examination for himself, he will not be heard to say that he
deceived to his injury by the misrepresentations of the
has been
78
vendor.
Additionally, a plaintiff cannot recover if he knew that the information was false. 79 In 200 East End Avenue Corp. v. General Electric
Co.,80 an owner-contractor brought an action for fraud and breach of
warranty relating to the purchase of a heating and cooling system.
Plaintiff claimed that defendant's circulars falsely represented that
by using defendant's units, tenants could have individual temperature control, year-round air conditioning and fresh air in the apartments without opening windows. An engineer retained by plaintiff,
however, testified that he was fully aware of the precise manner in
which defendant's units would and did perform. Accordingly, the
court held that:
However limited may be the duty to probe the truthfulness of a representation,... there can be no liability in fraud where the complaining party is, in advance, fully knowledgeable and apprised of
as to which the representations are alleged to have
those matters
81
deceived.
Under the common law, it is unclear the extent to which something more than negligence but less than actual knowledge by the
plaintiff will preclude recovery in an action based upon fraud. A
standard of recklessness would seem to prevail. In Feak v. Marion
Steam Shovel Co. ,82 a buyer of a steam shovel was advised and put
on notice that a third person owned the shovel. The buyer, however,

76. Schumaker v. Mather, 133 N.Y. 590, 596 (1892); Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris,
5 N.Y.2d 317, 157 N.E.2d 597, 184 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1959).
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 541 comment a (1977).
78. 192 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1904). The Supreme Court considered the general rule
but concluded that there are many instances which were distinguishable. See also
Costello v. Larsen, 182 Va. 567, 29 S.E.2d 856 (1944).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 541 (1977).
80. 5 A.D.2d 415, 172 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1955), a fd, 6 N.Y.2d 731, 158 N.E.2d 508, 185
N.Y.S.2d 816 (1959).
81. 5 A.D.2d at 418, 172 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
82. 84 F.2d 670 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 604 (1936). See also Lawrence
Warehouse Co. v. Dove Creek State Bank, 172 Colo. 90, 470 P.2d 838 (1970).
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went back to the defrauding party to allay his fears. The court
found that
where a party is once put upon notice of fraud he cannot avoid the
consequences of his constructive knowledge of the fraud nor fulfill
his duty to investigate by going to the party he suspects of the
fraud. He cannot desist from further investigation because he is
reassured of the truth of the original representation.8 3.
The case of City of Del Rio v. Ulen Contracting Corp.84 involved
a representation in a construction contract as to the state of incorporation and the domicile of the contractor. The city later ignored the
contract and performed the work itself and the contractor sued for
the consequent lost profits. Disallowing the city's defensive assertion of fraud, the court found that documents submitted as part of
the contractor's bid disclosed the actual facts and that "one cannot
85
close his eyes to the obvious and then claim to be deceived."
Similarly, Security Trust Co. v. O'Hair86 involved the sale of corporate stock with representations as to its value where plaintiff previously had loaned the corporation money and knew of its poor
financial condition. The Indiana Appellate Court held that there
was no justifiable reliance stating:
[W]e hold that when both parties are dealing at arm's length and
one party, in spite of the facts well known to him, deliberately ignores such facts and chooses to believe statements to the contrary,
he closes his eyes to the truth and deliberately takes a chance. It
was injured in law. All that can be said
then cannot be said that he 87
is that he gambled and lost.
In essence, Feak, City of Del Rio and Security Trust are cases
where the allegedly defrauded parties made a reckless and deliberate decision to disregard signals that the representations were false.
The effect of an investigation of some sort is treated as follows
88
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
83. 84 F.2d at 673. See also Applefield v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 176 So. 2d
366 (Fla. 1965). But see Dunn Appraisal Co. v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., No.
81-3110 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 1982); Garrett v. Perry, 53 Cal. 2d 178, 181-82, 346 P.2d 758, 760
(1959).
84. 94 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1938).
85. Id. at 703. See also Kaiser v. Nummeroff, 120 Wis. 234, 97 N.W. 932 (1935) (sale
of inventory the value of which could have been checked by simple addition and
where court held that plaintiff was not justified in relying on it without investigation).
86. 103 Ind. App. 56, 197 N.E. 694 (1935).
87. Id. at 59, 197 N.E. at 696-97.
88. RESTATEMElT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 546 (1977). See also Bank of Am. Nat'l
Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Vannini, 140 Cal. App. 2d 120, 295 P.2d 102 (1956); Sanford Constr. Co. v. S&H Contractors, 443 S.W.2d 227 (Ky. 1969); Gould v. Flato, 173 Misc. 378, 17
N.Y.S.2d 949 (1938).

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. III

Recipient Relying on His Own Investigation
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the maker of a fraudulent
misrepresentation is not liable to another whose decision to engage
in the transaction that the representation was intended to induce is
not caused by his belief in the truth of the representation but is the
result of an independent investigation made by him.
(2) The fact that the recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is
relying upon his own investigation does not relieve the maker from
liability if he by false statements or otherwise intentionally prevents the investigation from being effective.
The Restatement rule is a workable concept with adequate qualifications for each interested party.

B.

CONCEALMENT

When considering the duty to investigate, the cases do not distinguish between misrepresentation and concealment. Consequently, the above principles are also applicable to concealment
claims. In HartfordAccident & Indemnity Co. v. Kranz,89 the plaintiff surety brought an action to rescind a bond on a subcontractor's
performance. The plaintiff contended that defendant contractors
had failed to disclose another contract for which there was no bond.
The action was dismissed for lack of evidence of an intent on the
part of defendant to perpetrate a fraud on the plaintiff. The court
found that the plaintiff had not made any inquiries and that when it
first was informed of the second contract, it had not promptly objected or rescinded. In its decision the court stated: "With the opportunity to obtain knowledge of the facts, one cannot sit idly by to
reap the harvest, if plentiful, but in the event of scarcity, charge
fraud." 90
Similarly, Dambmann v. Schulting,9 1 involved an action for rescission of a release alleged to have been procured by fraudulent
concealment. In that case, plaintiff loaned defendant $10,000 to enable defendant to continue in business and thereafter pay off prior
sums owed to plaintiff. When the original debt was repaid, the
plaintiff executed a release of the debt with a moral obligation to repay the sum if he was able. This release was invalid for lack of consideration. Defendant later sold his business. The proceeds of the
sale were used to satisfy other debts, but the defendant retained
rights to one-third of whatever the goods should sell for above the
purchase price. Plaintiff asked the defendant the value of this share
89. 7 A.D.2d 604, 184 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1959).
90. Id. at 607, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 921. In Hartford, the court cited Magee v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 92 U.S. 93 (1875).
91. 75 N.Y. 55 (1878).
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and was told it was worth about $20,000. The goods were later sold,
and his interest came to about $100,000. When the defendant knew
his share was going to be larger than expected, he explained to
plaintiff that the prior release was inoperative and asked the plaintiff if he would execute a legal release upon payment of $5,000. This.
the plaintiff did. The court held that defendant's declarations were
made in good faith, that they were not made in any business transaction with plaintiff, and that there was no relationship of trust or
confidence compelling disclosure. The court further stated:
A party buying or selling property, or executing instruments,
must by inquiry or examination gain all the knowledge he desires.
He cannot proceed blindly, omitting all inquiry and examination,
and then complain92that the other party did not volunteer all the information he had.
The principle would seem to be different, however, where there
was a half truth, a relationship of trust or the concealing party with
superior knowledge was put on notice that the other party was acting under a misconception as to material facts.
C.

NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION

In an action for negligent misrepresentation, the standard of
care expected of plaintiff shifts from the recklessness standard to an
ordinary negligence standard.93 Consequently, a plaintiff is barred
from recovering for negligent misrepresentation if the plaintiff himself was careless in accepting the misrepresentation as true when
held to the standard of care, knowledge, intelligence and judgment
of a reasonable man. As stated in section 552A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts:
Contributory Negligence
The recipient of a negligent misrepresentation is barred from recovery for pecuniary loss suffered in reliance upon it if he is negligent
in so relying. 94
The duty to investigate is inherent in this rule. 95
92. Id. at 61-62.
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552A comment a (1977).

94. Id.
95. As noted above, in certain factual settings, the duty to investigate may be inapplicable. This is particularly true with respect to certified experts, such as accountants and auditors, who issue fraudulent reports. A party is justified in its reliance on
representations made by experts concerning existing facts which the relying party
has not itself investigated or to which it does not have equal access. Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954); Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 159
P.2d 958 (1945); Harazim v. Lyman, 267 Cal. App. 2d 127, 72 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1968).
The element of reliance is satisfied even where a defrauded party relies on more
than one report or expert opinion. As stated in MacDonald v. De Fremery, 168 Cal.
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APPLICATION OF THE DUTY TO INVESTIGATE IN
THE COMPUTER FIELD

For most computer products there are a variety of manufacturers and systems. Each system or product can have similar and different capabilities or features. Purchasers frequently investigate
and compare the equipment and systems. Furthermore, the purchasers know that computers and computer systems are constantly
evolving and that there are inherent uncertainties in the debugging
and use of any computer system. Consequently, the purchaser has
a duty to investigate and must be bound by its investigation or failure to investigate. The legal principles outlined above should apply
in the computer context.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Claimant-purchasers are bound by their actions even when they
assert fraud claims in an attempt to avoid the consequences of such
actions. Consequently, a claimant must prove, as an element of a
fraud claim, that its reliance was reasonable. The sophisticated
commercial claimant-purchaser of a computer system must overcome the defense assertion that the purchaser had failed in its duty
to investigate. This defense is qualified, but in many computer
cases it can be an effective counter-attack for the manufacturer.
The post-transaction activity of a claimant-purchaser also can

have a binding effect. When liability seems clear, the "Achilles
heel" of a fraud action is the damage element. In situations involv-

ing fraudulent inducement of a contract for the purchase of a computer system, the contractual limitations of liability may limit the
obtainable damages. By affirming the contract and retaining its ben-

efits, the claimant must accept its limitations. The cases are divided
189, 142 P. 73 (1914), a case involving receipt by plaintiff of a report of the financial
condition of a bank which was misleading as to the value of the bank's loans, discounts, bonds and securities: "It is sufficient, in order to maintain the action, that the
false statement was one, although it may not have been the sole, inducement for the
purchase." Id. at 201, 142 P.2d at 78. See also Davis v. Butler, 154 Cal. 623, 98 P. 1047
(1968); Friedberg v. Weissbuch, 135 Cal. App. 2d 750, 287 P.2d 785 (1955). In these situations a buyer is not required to employ experts to investigate matters of a technical
nature of which a defendant expert has full knowledge, and where the defendant has
certified its work. Hefferan v. Freebairn, 34 Cal. 2d 715, 720, 214 P.2d 386, 389 (1950).
See also Ferguson v. Koch, 204 Cal. 342, 268 P. 342 (1928); Milmoe v. Dixon, 101 Cal.
App. 2d 257, 225 P.2d 273 (1950); Blackman v. Howes, 82 Cal. App. 2d 275, 185 P.2d 1019
(1947). The computer field, however, does not frequently encompass such certified
expert opinions or reports. Computer manufacturers and vendors are just that, and a
customer must investigate what it is to purchase. The customer's degree of knowledge and sophistication will be an important element to determine whether its reliance upon representations was reasonable.
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on the application of contractual limitation of liability clauses in the
face of a fraud claim. The better authority, however, demonstrates
that affirmance of the contract by the purchaser makes the limita96
tion of liability clauses applicable.
There is nothing in the nature of these limitation of liability
97
clauses to distinguish them from a clause compelling arbitration,
from a clause waiving jury trial,98 or from a clause imposing a short
statute of limitations. 99 All of these various contractual provisions
apply in fraud actions.
The courts may have occasion to construe a clause, as in Waterman,1°° to ascertain that the clause sought to be invoked is broad
enough to apply to the claimed wrongs. But once so construed the
clause does not become binding by virtue of the original intent of
the parties. The clause is made binding by the act of the claimantpurchaser in affirming the contract and thereby making the choice
not to disaffirm the entire contract for fraud and, instead, to accept
the benefits of the contract and to thereby accept its burdens as
well.
Thus, when a claimant has affirmed the contract its recovery in
fraud should be restricted by the liability limits of the contract.

96. Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975). See supra note
41 and accompanying text.
97. Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 280 F.2d 915 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 911 (1960).
98. Leav v. Weitzner, 268 A.D. 466, 51 N.Y.S.2d 755 (1944).
99. Soviero Bros. Contracting Corp. v. City of New York, 286 A.D. 435, 142 N.Y.S.2d
508 (1955), affd, 2 N.Y.2d 924, 141 N.E.2d 918, 161 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1957).
100. Waterman-Bic Pen Corp. v. L.E. Waterman Pen Co., 8 A.D.2d 378, 187 N.Y.S.2d
872, rev'g 19 Misc. 2d 421, 44 N.Y.S. 221 (1959). See supra note 43.

